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Defendant and Appellant.
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Utah State Attorney General
Kris Leonard
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Steven B. Killpack, Esq. #1808
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Attorney for Appellant
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Telephone: (801) 379-2577

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

Case No. 930640-CA
JOE F. JIRON,
Defendant/Appellant

:

The Defendant, Joe F. Jiron, through counsel, petitions the Utah Court of
Appeals, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for
a Rehearing of the above entitled appeal based upon the following arguments.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
1.

After the submission by the parties of an appellant's brief, a response

brief by the State and a reply brief by the appellant, the Utah Court of Appeals
rendered it's decision, filed September 27, 1994, affirming Jiron's conviction of
murder and arson (248 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

On October 11, 1994, Jiron filed a motion for an extension of time

to file a petition for rehearing with the Utah Court of Appeals. Based upon an
extension of time granted by the Court, by Order dated October 14, 1994, Jiron
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has until November 14, 1994, in which to file a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
AND ARSON.
In addressing Jiron's contention that the evidence as presented at trial was
insufficient to warrant conviction, this Court, in its opinion stated:
After a careful review of the evidence, we conclude that there is
evidence from which all the elements of the crimes can be established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.
The only specific recitation of the facts that allegedly support the verdict are
set out at the beginning of the Court's Opinion. The facts as recited therein omit
key evidence:
1. The opinion omits the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Fred C. Jensen
(the first person on the scene by nearly one hour) that he had extensive experience
in emergency procedures and in handling dead bodies and that he felt a pulse in
Shelly Jiron's neck when he arrived (Tr. Vol. I at 76-77, 78).
2. The opinion omits key testimony relating to the time of death. Mr.
Jensen testified that he could not detect any rigor mortis (Tr. Vol. I at 82-83).
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After being subjected to temperatures of less than 20 degrees for nearly an hour,
the paramedics described Shelly Jiron's body only as "clavey." Mr. Andreason,
the field medical examiner noted only slight rigor mortis and lividity late that
evening when he examined the body (Tr. Vol. II at 295). The doctor estimated the
time of death at 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. on December 17, 1991 (Tr. Vol. V at
1129-1131). The medical testimony itself indicated the unreliability of the
evidence (Tr. Vol. V at 1177-1178); Tr. Vol. VI at 1268-1272, 1273-1275).
3. This Court's previous opinion ignored the uncontroverted evidence and
testimony of the law enforcement personnel that Shelly Jiron's vehicle left the road
and travelled approximately 750 feet without significant braking (Tr. Vol. I at 99,
106, 109).
4. In reciting the facts, this Court's opinion began with Jiron leaving for
work on December 16. However, it omits the relevant facts that Jiron and his
wife, Dawn, had been separated as much as they were together and that there were
no unusual events that preceded the occurrences on December 16 (Tr. Vol. II at
334-335). While Jiron left his wife with instructions that would relate to a
separation or divorce, there is no evidence of any hostility either to Dawn or to
Shelly Jiron. To the contrary, the evidence is uncontroverted that Jiron called
Shelly from Springville because of car trouble and that Shelly picked him up in her
car. Shelly told her mother that Joe was having some personal problems and as in
the past, Shelly was going to help him work them out (Tr. Vol. II at 507). Jiron
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and Shelly visited Shelly's Mother and Jiron's sister before leaving for Nevada.
According to his sister, the couple was happy, joking and having a good time (Tr.
Vol. Ill at 543). The evidence is uncontroverted that Jiron and Shelly stayed in
Wendover, Nevada, the evening of December 16 and that at 10:11 a.m. on
December 17, 1991, when Shelly called her sister from Wendover, the couple was
happy, having a good time, and planning on taking a shower together before going
to breakfast (Tr. Vol. II at 450; Tr. Vol. Ill at 539-541, 542, 547).
5. Although this Court's opinion refers to the fact that Jiron and Shelly
pulled off the road at a secluded location (Tr. Vol. Ill at 650), the opinion omits
the fact that a pair of ladies underwear was found there together with toilet paper,
the victim's cigarette butts and absolutely no evidence of any violence (Tr. Vol. Ill
at 652-656; Tr. Vol. IV at 989-990, 995-996).
6. In discussing the presence of spilled gasoline in Shelly's car that ignited
causing the fire, this Court's opinion recites that "the investigation eliminated the
possibility that gas was spilled by accident." 248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. Mr.
Halladay's testimony did not have the benefit of Jiron's regained memory that the
gas can in the back seat tipped over while the parties were engaged in sexual
intercourse and that the gasoline spilled as he attempted to get a hold of the can
and bring it into the front seat until the parties returned home. Additionally,
Halladay acknowledged that the fire could have been ignited by the static electricity
generated from Shelly taking her sweater off after it became saturated in gas (Tr.
4

Vol. V at 1091). Halladay acknowledged that Jiron's fingerprints were not found
on any of the matches (Tr. Vol. V at 1061-1068). The only evidence relied upon
by Halladay is the spill pattern which indicated that the gasoline was spilled as a
can was taken from the back seat to the front seat. That explanation did not
eliminate, and in fact, included, Jiron's explanation, offered in support of his
motion for a new trial.
7. This Court's factual recitation of the medical evidence omits facts central
to causation. One of the key issues was obviously whether Shelly was alive when
the fire was set. The State contended that Jiron had already killed her. Skin
Slippage was noted on Shelly's body which Dr. Gruwell testified constituted
"blistering" evidencing that Shelly was alive at the time of the fire (Tr. Vol. VI at
1293). Although Dr. Leis initially disagreed, he finally admitted that the blisters
could have occurred before or after death (Tr. Vol. VI at 1367-1369, 1373-1374).
Contrary to the conclusion in this Court's opinion, the doctor testified that the anal
injuries were due to sexual activity and probably caused by an object such as a fist
or ring (Tr. Vol. V at 1114-1115). There was also evidence of soot fragments in
Shelly's epiglottis evidencing a respiratory effort to inhale air (Tr. Vol. V at 11931196). In addition, both doctors increased levels of toluene and xylene in the
vitreous fluid of the eye indicating that the victim inhaled gasoline vapors that
entered her blood stream while she was alive (Tr. Vol. V at 1127-1128, 11721174). Finally, although testifying that the cause of death was asphyxia, Dr. Leis
5

acknowledged that he could not determine if it had been caused by smothering,
suffocation, or strangulation (Tr. Vol. V at 1186). None of the typical signs of
strangulation were found (Tr. Vol V. at 1148-1152). The injuries found on Shelly
either individually or cumulatively were not life threatening (Tr. Vol. V at 11681169). The only explanation given by the doctors as to how Shelly could have
died by asphyxia was that of Dr. Gruwell who testified that Shelly could have
choked by a substance being ingested and getting past the epiglottis and then being
introduced into the trachea, causing a spasm of the epiglottis closing the area over
the trachea (Tr. Vol. VI at 1296-1299, 1300).
The record is devoid of any evidence of any violent behavior of Jiron at all.
The evidence fails to establish any motive for a violent act by Jiron on Shelly's
person. Although Jiron and his wife, Dawn, were having difficulties, all of the
evidence relating to the relationship between Shelly and Jiron, at the time Shelly
died, indicated that they were good friends and lovers without any evidence of
hostility.
As noted below, the culmination of the State's use of innuendo was the
introduction of the love letter from Norman, Shelly's friend. It was admitted at
trial without any proof, by eye witnesses or forensic evidence, that Jiron ever
touched, read or knew about the letter. Even if Jiron had read the letter, there is
absolutely nothing in the record that would indicate that he, who was still married
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himself, would deem himself in a position to violently react to the fact that Shelly
Jiron received such a letter.
The evidence established that the victim, Shelly Jiron called Abelina Hunick
at 10:11 a.m. on the morning of December 17, from Wendover still contemplating
showering with the Defendant and eating breakfast. The accident occurred on the
west side of Utah Lake that evening at about 7:00 p.m. There is no evidence of
what transpired between those times with the exception of the evidence found at
the "second site." It is apparent that the parties stopped at that location, had sex
and talked while Shelly smoked several cigarettes. Again, there was no evidence
of violence or any altercation between the parties.
There is no question that the fire occurred while the car was proceeding
down the highway, causing Jiron to lose control and travel the nearly 750 feet to
the final resting spot. When Mr. Jensen found the vehicle, it was still warm
inside.
Given the fact that the fire occurred while Jiron and Shelly traveled down
the road together, the issue relating to the time of death is important. Dr. Leis
testified that he estimated the time of death to be eight and a half hours, give or
take an hour prior to the time the core temperature was obtained, at 10:05 p.m.
That calculation would put the time of death from 12:30 to 2:30 p.m.,
approximately five to six hours before the accident. Obviously, that opinion is in
conflict with Mr. Jensen who felt a pulse when he first examined the occupants of
7

the car. Dr. Leis testified that if the person had a reasonable degree of medical
training, the evidence from the witness on the scene would be more reliable. As
outlined in the statement of facts, Mr. Jensen had considerable experience in
emergency procedures and dealing with dead bodies. Both doctors testified that the
normal calculation of time of death derived from the core temperature would be
affected by outside temperature, clothing and other factors. Inasmuch as no one
was able to establish those factors, the time of death testimony is simply
speculation. There is significant testimony that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time
of the fire and the accident. The only testimony to the contrary is the core
temperature evidence which was not only conflicting but unreliable because it was
affected by elements of outside temperature, clothing and the like which were
unknown factors and could not be taken into account by the doctors.
The examination of the body also produced no definitive evidence of foul
play. Dr. Leis concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia or deprivation of
oxygen. Dr. Leis agreed that the mechanism of the death could not be determined.
The doctor testified that all of the wounds and injuries on the body were not life
threatening. In summary, Dr. Leis testified that the pre-death injuries were
hemorrhages to the back of the neck, the anal injuries and the petechiae. The only
post-death injuries were slippage of the skin and on cross-examination, Dr. Leis
testified that those could have been produced before or after the time of death.
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There was conflicting testimony on natural causes of death producing
asphyxia. The only theory advanced by the prosecution was that Shelly Jiron, after
having sex with the Defendant was suffocated by him, even though there was no
evidence of a physical scuffle at the "second site." Additionally, there was no
evidence of fighting or injuries to Jiron or to Shelly's body consistent with the
movements of a person who is being strangled. It is Jiron's position, that a finder
of fact, to come to the conclusion that the Defendant intentionally and knowingly
caused Shelly Jiron's death, had to engage in total speculation. Each of the
elements set out above can be construed to fit a number of factual scenarios that do
not involve foul play.
The evidence concerning the fire investigation is important. Mr. Halladay
testified that the gasoline spill appeared to be a pour consistent with a person
starting with the can in the back seat and pouring gasoline on the cars seat as he
brought his hand forward. However, that scenario is as consistent with the
detection of the gas can in the back seat spilling and an attempt to reach back and
get the can and replace a lid or stop the spill. The State's theory is advanced by the
presence of the book of matches and individual matches that had been torn from
the book. However, no evidence was found that Jiron handled the match book or
matches. Furthermore, the victim used matches to light her cigarettes. The only
lighter found was introduced late in the trial and the evidence that it had been
located even in the vehicle was suspect. The State's expert testified that the gas
9

spill in the car could have been ignited by a small amount of electricity, equivalent
to the amount from a static electric shock or that put off by a woman taking off a
sweater.
The evidence in this case is clearly insufficient when compared to the
quantum of proof required in other homicide cases. See Appellant's Brief at 4852. There simply is not sufficient evidence, including reasonable inferences that
would support the verdict. State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
Prior to this Court's decision opinion in this case, there was no Utah
precedent detailing the necessary showing for a Rule 59 motion claiming that
amnesia prevented the introduction of evidence and testimony at trial. Jiron,
because of an absence of general case law on the subject and the total vacuum of
authority in Utah, prepared a stipulation that was accepted by the State of Utah.
The stipulation of the parties constituted the entire quantum of proof offered on the
subject with the exception of the defendant's own testimony that his memory had
been affected.
In its opinion, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jiron's motion
for a new trial based upon the defendant's failure to show due diligence.
Specifically, this Court has held that:
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Jiron had the burden to establish that he was in fact suffering from amnesia
and that his memory would not return except through the passage of time . .

248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should allow the remand of this
case in order to allow the defendant to meet the standards that have now been
announced by the Court. It is respectfully submitted that trial counsel made a good
faith attempt at establishing the necessary elements and the State certainly did not
object to the showing that was made.
As it relates to the sufficiency of the proffered testimony, it is submitted that
the testimony meets the essential requirements of the Court. Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, is
the Director of the University of Utah Burn Center, where the Defendant was
treated. It is submitted that the proffered testimony assumed that the Defendant
was suffering from amnesia and was simply trying to offer the possible
explanations of that condition. Mr. Jiron, as recited at trial, had contended he had
no memory from the first time he was interrogated by law enforcement officers.
Inasmuch as the State did not contest the existence of amnesia, there was no reason
either at trial or when the motions for a new trial were made, to establish the
elements now set by the Court.
As outlined in the first point of this memorandum, a vacuum was created by
the inability of Jiron to testify at the time of trial to the essential details of this
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case. The reason for his inability to testify was accepted by all parties to be the
presence of amnesia. Neither the trial court nor the State contested the presence of
defendant's amnesia at trial or at the time Jiron's motion for a new trial was
argued. Only the State on appeal, and this Court in it's decision, have questioned
the presence of amnesia— which Jiron does not now have the chance to factually
rebut. A fair and complete presentation of the facts can only obtained if thid Court
allows a new trial to establish the facts that Jiron's amnesia prevented.
POINT in
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR
IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE LETTER FROM NORMAN STILLEY
TO SHELLY JIRON
It is respectfully submitted that this Court's opinion overlooked the
significance of the admissibility of the "Love Letter" from Norman Stilley to
Shelly Jiron. See Appellant's Brief at 71-72. A copy of the letter may be found in
the Addendum of Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 4. Jiron argues that this Court
should find that the trial court erred in admitting the letter at trial over Jiron's
objection (Tr. Vol. Ill at 629).
Jiron filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the trial court exclude the
letter (R. 56-60). The court denied the motion (R. 330-33). However, in so
ruling, the court conditioned the admission of the letter to the establishment of
intent or motive upon Jiron's "knowing of or reading the letter" (R. 332). Jiron
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argues that the conditional fact of his "knowing of or reading the letter" was never
established; and therefore, the letter should not have been admitted at trial.
Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes that "where the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." Jiron asserts that based upon an
examination of all the evidence, the jury could not reasonably find the conditional
fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Appellee's Brief at 65-66 (quoting
Huddleston v. United States. 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)).
The facts in regards to the letter are as follows: Norman Stilley, a friend of
Shelly Jiron's at the time of her death, wrote the letter and sealed it in an envelope
while waiting for Shelly at her Mother's house on December 15, 1991 (Tr. Vol. II
at 488-490, 505). The next day, December 16, 1991, when Shelly accompanied
by Joe Jiron arrived at her mother's house to pick up the children, she also picked
up a diaper bag of the children's things, the letter and two roses left with the letter
(Tr. Vol. II at 497). Shelly Jiron's Mother, Carma, testified at trial that she did
not know if Joe Jiron saw the letter or the roses (Tr. Vol. II at 497-98, 501-502).
On the night of December 17, 1991, when Shelly Jiron's car was found off the
road an in an embankment, the diaper bag containing the children's things was
found between Shelly Jiron's chest and knees where an EMT had to "tug hard to
get it out" (Tr. Vol. I at 203-204). When the contents of the bag were later
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examined, the letter from Norman to Shelly was found in the opened envelope
"right near the top" or "just off to the side or in the upper part of the bag" (Tr.
Vol. I at 182; Tr. Vol. Ill at 627). When found the bag was "we to the touch"
and "had a strong smell of gasoline to it" (Tr. Vol. Ill at 626, 665). During
careful forensic examinations of the letter, although fingerprints were obtained on
the letter, Jiron's fingerprints were not found thereon; however, the forensic expert
did testify that he could not draw any firm conclusions in regards to whether Jiron
ever handled the letter (Tr. Vol. V at 998-1000).
Jiron argues that the evidence evidence presented is not sufficient to support
the trial court's finding of the fulfillment of the condition that Jiron kne\> of or had
read the letter because based upon an examination of all the evidence as set forth
above, the jury could not reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that
Jiron, in fact, knew of the letter's contents or had read it. Moreover, the trial
court's admission of the letter was harmful error, the absence of which would have
resulted in a reasonable liklihood of an outcome more favorable to Jiron. See State
v. O'NeiL 848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993). It was Jiron's supposed jealous reaction to the letter in question that gave
the State a reason for his alleged violence. Without the letter, the State is left
without any reasoning to support the claimed homicidal outrage. If the jury had
not been tainted by the introduction of the letter at trial, a different result would
have been likely. As a result, Jiron requests that this Court find that the trial court
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committed harmful error in admitting the letter from Norman StiUey to Shelly
Jiron; and therefore, Jiron be afforded a new trial.

SUBMITTED, in Good Faith, this _/^day of November, 1994.

Steven B. Killpacl^
Attorney for Jir<

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that two (2) copies of Apellant's Petition for Rehearing were
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kris Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
DATED this /j£ day of November, 1994.
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